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riod, the dominance of capital, the growing military superiority 
of centers of capitalist growth, and the widening disparities in 
the global economy are ultimately driven by the logic of fossil-
based capitalism. From 1800 to 1950, the global economy experi-
enced growing centralization of capital and power, dividing the 
global economy into an advanced and dominant Center and a 
backward and subordinate Periphery. A period of decentraliza-
tion follows from 1950 to1990, when most segments of the Pe-
riphery regained various levels of control over their economies. 
Since the early 1990s, the forces of centralization have gained the 
upper hand.    
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 This is a short history of the global economy since 1800. It is 
about the system of global capitalism that took shape once the 
British economy went ‘underground’ and began to draw its en-
ergy and, increasingly, its raw materials from mineral resources. 
The progressive substitution of minerals for plants, as the 
economy’s source of energy and raw materials, transformed the 
dynamics of capitalism. It opened up vast new sources of energy 
and raw materials, freeing the economy from the narrow re-
source constraints of an organic, plant-based economy. The new 
cheaper, more abundant energy produced dramatic reductions 
in the costs of transportation; a growing volume and range of 
goods could now enter into long-distance and international 
trade; and this rapidly created the basis for an international divi-
sion of labor. But the resource substitution also deepened the 
logic of uneven development. On the one hand, the mineral-
based economy created several positive feedbacks that strength-
ened the already existing tendency towards the division of trad-
ing areas into Core and Periphery, or concentrations of high and 
low value-added activities. In addition, it augmented the mili-
tary power of the states that pioneered these new technolgies. 
Together, these tendencies—markets, energy substitution, and 
force—created the modern global economy, increasingly inte-
grated but also deeply divided into a Core and Periphery.1 
The history of the new mineral-based global economy falls 
into three phases, defined with reference to the degree of global 
centralization of power. The first phase, lasting from 1800 to 
1945, concentrated power—and, with it, capital, technology, sci-
ence and manufactures—in a small number of Core areas, nota-
bly Britain, France, United States, and Germany. Conversely, the 
greater part of the Periphery—nearly all of Asia and Africa—lost 
its sovereignty to a few Core countries, was forced to open their 
                                                 
1 The terms, organic and mineral-based economy, are borrowed from Wrigley 
(1988: 12). 
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economies to Core capital, specialized in primary goods, and 
scarcely experienced any improvements in the living standards 
of the indigenous population. The global economy slowly en-
tered into a second phase in the late 1940s, although this process 
was initiated earlier with the Russian Revolution of 1917, when 
power was decentralized from the Core to the Periphery. On the 
level of the economy, this decentralization reversed the earlier 
concentration of manufactures in the Core countries, and pro-
duced dramatic acceleration of growth in the dependent Periph-
ery. Starting in the 1980s, however, power was again re-
centralized in the Core countries. Already, by the mid-1990s, this 
re-centralization had exceeded the previous peak in the global 
centralization of power attained during the late nineteenth cen-
tury. This paper will examine these three movements of the 
global economy, though the emphasis will be on analyzing the 
dynamics of the third movement. 
 
Two Economic Logics 
 
It is important to begin by laying out, if only briefly, the different 
logics underlying the organic, land-based economy that held 
center stage before 1800 and the inorganic, mineral-based econ-
omy that has been developing since that date.  
In the old agrarian system, two factors perennially con-
strained its capacity for economic growth. This system drew 
nearly all its energy from plants, the source of our food, fuel, fi-
ber and other raw materials; this constrained the supply of en-
ergy since the land necessary for growing plants was available 
only in finite quantities. In addition, this system only used or-
ganic instruments, men and animals, for converting the energy 
captured by plants into mechanical energy. These organic in-
struments did not favor growth since their upkeep required 
large amounts of land, and their efficiency at converting energy 
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could scarcely be improved upon. As a result, once all accessible 
land had been brought into use, the agrarian system grew by 
improving the organization of work, primarily through division 
of labor; inventing machines that enhanced the efficiency of 
work; or improving the quality of existing lands. The division of 
labor offered the best prospects for growth, though this was lim-
ited—as Adam Smith so famously noted—by the extent of the 
market, or transportation and institutions of exchange. Most im-
portantly, once all the land was in use, the limits on growth 
pressed harder. It was land, or its ability to fix solar energy 
through plants, that appeared to impose the final constraint on 
growth in this organic economy. 
The new inorganic economy that developed after 1800 tran-
scended the dual limits that constrained growth in the organic 
economy. It drew its energy and raw materials increasingly from 
stocks of minerals, and since these stocks were quite large rela-
tive to the rate at which they could be drawn down, this virtu-
ally lifted the cap on energy flows available to the economy. 
More importantly, the energy from fossil fuels was converted to 
mechanical energy by machines: the steam engine and, later, in-
ternal combustion engine. Once these machines outstripped the 
organic instruments for converting energy to work, they found 
growing applications in transportation, manufacturing, and, 
eventually, agriculture. In time, the cheaper energy, when com-
bined with advances in science and technology, produced 
cheaper inorganic substitutes for organic raw materials. This 
was in addition to the uses of fossil fuels, which began at an ear-
lier date, in heating homes, lighting and smelting.  
This energy revolution created a variety of positive feed-
backs. First, the fossil fuels freed land from producing fuels and 
fodder; the development of inorganic substitutes for organic raw 
materials had the same effect. In other words, even as the new 
economy expanded, it released land that could be used for pro-
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ducing more food and organic raw materials, and we can expect 
this to reduce the industrial economy’s propensity to imports of 
food and raw materials, at least during the early stages of this 
development. Second, the cheaper energy reduced the costs of 
manufacturing and transportation; in turn, the cheaper transpor-
tation produced cumulative cost reductions in manufacturing 
through wider markets, greater division of labor, technology 
spillovers, and other linkages. These cumulative cost-reductions 
and, in part, their localized effects, created a tendency to concen-
trate the world’s manufactures in countries—the Core coun-
tries—that took an early lead in harnessing the new energy. 
Conversely, the rest of the world, the Periphery, specialized in 
producing food and raw materials, still using the old source of 
energy. Finally, the new energy per se stimulated endless innova-
tions in production technology. Since large and increasing 
amounts of energy could now be concentrated at one point in 
space, this led to the development of larger, faster, and more 
powerful machines for use in transportation, manufacturing, 
mining, construction and, eventually, agriculture. This consti-
tuted a third source of cumulative growth in the industrial econ-
omy. 
The energy revolution had created a new economic dynam-
ics. Unlike the muscle-driven, plant-based, land-constrained 
agrarian economy, the industrial economy increasingly drew 
upon minerals for its energy and raw materials, employed en-
gines to convert fossil fuels to mechanical energy, and used this 
energy to mechanize work in manufacturing, transportation, 
construction, and agriculture. The productive capacity of the in-
dustrial economy was not constrained by energy, as in the old 
agrarian economy, but by its ability to deploy machines that 
converted energy to work. The engine of growth in this econ-
omy was capital accumulation, since this determined how fast it 
could expand the stock of energy-converting and energy-using 
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machines available to the economy. As a result, capitalists re-
placed landlords as the central actors in the new industrial econ-
omy. 
These profound changes created new classes and class con-
flicts. The new energy-converting and energy-using machines 
downgraded the workers in manufacturing even as they pushed 
this sector to the center of the economy. Of course, the workers 
were still needed, but the new machines diminished their impor-
tance. Now the workers could not own their machines, which 
were too expensive compared to what they were able to save 
individually. The craftsmen, artisans, and even peasants, became 
labor, hired by capitalists to tend to the machines, fix them when 
they broke down, or perform tasks that had not yet been mecha-
nized. The machines—and their capitalist proprietors—now 
employed the workers. In addition, since the new energy created 
concentrations of factories, it also assembled great masses of 
workers in one workplace. These conditions favored the growth 
of class consciousness on both sides of the production process. 
The industrial economy deepened the polarizing tendencies 
in the agrarian system. Formerly, due to the greater economies 
of scale in manufactures compared to primary goods, there was 
a tendency for manufactures to be concentrated in countries 
which acquired the biggest markets, whether by chance or force. 
By reducing the costs of manufactures and transportation and 
creating mineral-based substitutes for raw materials, the energy 
revolution strengthened this tendency. In addition, both directly 
and indirectly, the energy revolution added to a country’s mili-
tary power by stimulating prosperity, reducing the cost of arms 
and armaments, and improving military technology as inventors 
drew upon the general advances in the economy’s technical ca-
pabilities. In time, the development of steamboats, better pro-
phylactics against tropical diseases, and the development of 
rapid-firing weapons sealed the fate of Africa and Asia; they 
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were colonized or converted into open-door countries.2 The 
white-dominated Periphery in Europe and Latin America had 
the protection of membership in the European family of civilized 
nations. 3 
The first countries to adopt the new energy system would 
have a near-lock on the global economy. It created a set of cumu-
lative forces that concentrated manufactures, capital, technology 
and power in the countries that took a lead in the energy revolu-
tion—the Core countries. Simultaneously, the new energy sys-
tem created a Periphery, economic regions that were restruc-
tured by Core capital to supply food, agricultural raw materials 
and minerals to the Core. In varying combinations, military 
force, markets and racist ideologies brought about this restruc-
turing. It is the story of this global economy that we narrate in 
these pages. 
 
Karl Marx and Class Contradictions 
 
In his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) does not once refer 
to any of the early signs of an industrial revolution—the har-
nessing of waterpower, the use of steam engine in mines, or the 
rise of factory production. Although he was greatly impressed 
by the power of division of labor in manufacturing, he believed 
that diminishing returns to capital and labor, in the presence of 
fixed amounts of land, would eventually lead the economy into 
a stationary state. This remained the vision of classical econo-
mists even as late as the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Amongst classical economists, Karl Marx (1848) alone took 
serious notice of the industrial revolution. In graphic passages, 
he describes the quickening pace of history, the tremendous ex-
pansive power of capital, its constant search for new markets 
                                                 
2 Headrick (1981). 
3 Strang (1996)). 
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and new technologies, and how this was pushing small-scale 
producers into the ranks of workers, and unleashing profound 
changes in the economic and social landscape of pre-capitalist 
societies everywhere. These transformations had produced two 
great classes, capitalist and workers, constantly at odds with 
each other. At the global level, this expansive dynamic was de-
stroying pre-capitalist societies and binding them into a single 
system of global markets. Although Marx did not worry too 
much about the origins of capitalism—he saw its precursors in 
the burghers of medieval towns, the growing commerce stimu-
lated by the discoveries, and the system of Atlantic trade—he 
was reasonably certain that the system he was describing was 
fully developed or nearly so. Indeed, it was ready for another 
epochal transformation, and he might even live to see that hap-
pen in his own lifetime. As it was, Marx underestimated the du-
rability of the system he was analyzing. 
Class contradictions are central to Marx’s analysis of capital-
ism. The two great classes spawned by industrial capitalism, 
capitalists and workers, had opposite interests. The capitalists 
were driven by competition to accumulate, innovate, and ex-
pand their market shares; this produced concentrations of capi-
tal and deepening business cycles. By the same logic, they 
sought to drive down wages and lengthen the workweek; this 
pauperized the workers. At some point, Marx predicted, even in 
his own lifetime, these two tendencies would produce a prole-
tarian revolution. Led by the communist party, the workers 
would overthrow the capitalists, abolish markets, socialize own-
ership and production, and lay the foundations of a new social 
formation. 
History did not oblige Karl Marx. There would be no prole-
tarian revolutions in the advanced industrial countries, where 
capitalist contradictions were most ripe for the overthrow of 
capitalism. The workers stirred in less likely places, but were 
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easily suppressed. On the whole, the class contradictions were 
contained, as capitalist growth created a middle class, and rising 
labor productivity began to translate into higher wages for pro-
duction workers. In time, when the workers organized, it was 
not to overthrow the system but to demand higher wages and 
better working conditions. Slowly, capitalists acceded to these 
demands, as unionized power expanded, workers gained voting 
rights, and labor parties gained ground at the ballot. The emer-
gence of the Soviet Union, the first worker’s state, pushed Core 
capital towards greater accommodation with their working 
classes. In addition, since there was little industrialization in the 
Periphery yet, their concessions to labor did not dampen the in-
ternational competitiveness of Core capital. Finally, with help 
from compulsory schooling and the media, the system suc-
ceeded in socializing the workers as citizens, endowed with 
rights and the illusion that they were free to move up the social 
ladder through education, thriftiness and hard work. 
 
Imperialist Rivalry 
 
The challenges to Core capital came from two sources not antici-
pated by Karl Marx: the rivalry of countries seeking entry into 
the Core, and attempts by the Periphery to overthrow the Core’s 
hegemony.  
The outward expansion of Core capital was a central result of 
Karl Marx’s analysis of capitalism. He never worried that any-
thing short of a proletarian revolution could reverse this expan-
sion; it would penetrate all parts of the world, and transform 
and launch them on development trajectories similar to those 
traveled by the Core countries. Karl Marx had not foreseen that 
the global expansion of Core capital, in and of itself, might gen-
erate contradictions that would reverse for several decades the 
capitalist penetration of the Periphery. We are indebted to 
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Vladimir Lenin and the neo-Marxists for drawing out attention 
to these contradictions.  
Contrary to the mythical accounts of orthodox economists, 
we observe an intimate connection between the capital and the 
state at least in the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. In the 
new age heralded by the energy revolution, capital in the Core 
countries would use the expanded powers of the state to try to 
acquire exclusive control over markets and resources in the Pe-
riphery. Starting in the nineteenth century, this produced a new 
wave of direct colonization of societies – in Asia, Africa and Car-
ibbean – that did not have the protection of membership in the 
Western “family of nations.” At least for a while, the parceling of 
the world into colonies proceeded quite smoothly. There was 
plenty of real estate for everyone.  
The first challenge emerged when powerful new entrants into 
the Core – Germany, Italy and Japan – were seized with empire 
envy.  The old timers, Britain, France and Netherlands, had ap-
propriated all the real prizes in Africa and Asia. Miffed, the 
newcomers decided that their best chance of gaining an empire 
was to take it from those who had one. In time, as Britain’s 
hegemonic control weakened, this produced two fratricidal 
World Wars, fought mostly amongst Western countries at the 
Core. According to an African proverb, when elephants fight, 
the grass gets trampled on. In this case, whether by good or ill 
luck, the grass would have a chance to grow. 
 
Core-Periphery Contradictions 
 
Industrial capitalism spawned powerful cumulative processes—
operating through markets, military power and racist ideologies 
of domination—which concentrated capital, manufactures, tech-
nology and power in the Core countries. The dependent Periph-
ery in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, regions that lost their sov-
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ereignty, specialized in the production of primary goods for ex-
port. 
The centralizing tendencies of Core capital acted strongly and 
quickly. By 1913, according to Bairoch (1982: 296, 304), two-
thirds of the world’s manufactures were concentrated in four 
Core countries: Britain, United States, Germany and France. In 
1750, their combined share had stood at less than a tenth. At the 
same time, the Core countries reduced vast areas of the world—
nearly all of Asia, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean—
to colonies, open-door countries or dependencies, which were 
converted to the production of primary exports. Those parts of 
the Periphery that enjoyed various degrees of political autonomy 
were luckier. By 1950, many of them had developed indigenous 
capital, skills and manufactures. 
The contradiction between the Core and dependent Periph-
ery was on display, most transparently, in the widening gap be-
tween the living standards of the two economic areas. According 
to Bairoch (1981), Britain had roughly the same per capita in-
come as Asia in 1800; but, in 1950, it had gained a lead of close to 
six to one. Africa suffered a similar decline in its relative posi-
tion. On an average, the sovereign parts of the Periphery did not 
face a decline in their relative position during this period. 
Once again, history had dashed the great hopes of Karl Marx. 
Core capital had penetrated the Periphery—in fact, its political 
penetration of the dependent Periphery was nearly complete—
but failed to transform its productive potential. Instead, the 
global expansion of Core capital had polarized the world, divid-
ing it into two unequal moieties, the Core and the Periphery, 
connected by the disequalizing impact of trade, imperialism and 
racist ideologies. In the words of Andre Gunder Frank, capitalist 
development at the Core produced underdevelopment in the 
Periphery. It is important to note that this inverse dynamic was 
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strongest in the relations between the Core countries and the 
dependent parts of the Periphery.  
The prospects for growth in the dependent parts of the Pe-
riphery were dim as long as they could not structure their eco-
nomic relations with Core capital. Yet, the system itself offered a 
break. Help came when the elephants got into fights—big fights, 
better known as World Wars. These wars battered the strength 
of the elephants, creating opportunities for indigenous capital in 
the Periphery. When these wars directly involved major coun-
tries in the Periphery—Russia in the First World War, and China 
in the Second World War—they created openings for the emer-
gence of radical political movements. Thus was born the October 
Revolution of 1917, amidst the chaos of Russian defeat during 
the First World War, producing the first systemic challenge to 
Core capital. Ironically, the challenge had come from the Periph-
ery. 
The October Revolution of 1917 began a temporary reversal 
in the global concentration of capital, power and manufactures. 
It gave an impetus to liberation movements—in the colonies and 
open-door countries—that were already challenging this concen-
tration, even pushing some towards radical solutions. The Soviet 
Union stood as the vanguard, the one great ally, of liberation 
movements seeking to roll back the colonial empires and 
weaken the polarizing dynamic of global capital. When the ele-
phants fought again twenty years later, these decentralizing 
movements were poised for major victories. 
Most importantly, the Second World War battered the major 
colonial powers, those who won no less than those who lost. Of 
course, the defeated powers, Italy and Japan, instantly lost all 
their colonies. The victorious colonial powers, Britain, France, 
Belgium and Netherlands, found that they had lost too much of 
their former strength to successfully defend their empires, espe-
cially as the liberation movements gathered steam. In most 
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cases, they decided to pull out of their colonies before the anti-
colonial movements turned violent; this also offered the best op-
portunity of preserving their economic interests and influence in 
the former colonies. A massive decentralization of power fol-
lowed, larger, more dramatic and deeper than the one that 
marked the dismantling of Spain’s American empire in the 
1820s.  
This was a window of opportunity for the Periphery, espe-
cially the former colonies and open-door countries who were 
now free to restructure their relations with Core capital. Several 
tried collective ownership and planning, and insisted on a radi-
cal break from global markets. By the 1970s, nearly a third of the 
world’s population lived in communist countries. Many more 
did not reject markets as such, but adopted a variety of interven-
tionist measures to develop indigenous capital, manufactures 
and skills. Starting in the 1950s, the former colonies jettisoned 
the colonial doctrines of laissez faire, free trade, balanced budg-
ets, and private ownership. In their place, they introduced inter-
ventionist policies to accelerate the pace of development.  
This decentralization produced some dramatic results. The 
share of the Periphery – Africa, Latin America, and Asia minus 
Japan – in world manufacturing output had shrunk to 6.5 per-
cent in 1953 from a dominant share of 73 percent in 1750. After 
two centuries of decline, this share began to increase in the 
1950s, and rose to 12 percent in 1980. In addition, the growth 
rates in the Periphery accelerated dramatically. The per capita 
income in the largest colonies and quasi-colonies, containing 
some 50 percent of the world’s population, grew at an average 
annual growth of 0.5 and -0.27 percent over 1900-1913 and 1913-
1950; the same growth rates for the sovereign countries in the 
Periphery were 1.61 percent and 1.34 percent. Over 1950-1992, 
the growth rates in the former colonies and quasi-colonies had 
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jumped to 2.96 percent, ahead of the 2.58 percent recorded for 
the always-sovereign countries in the Periphery.4 
 
Re-Centralizing Power 
 
The retrenchment of Core capital would not last. Starting in the 
1980s, the IMF and World Bank began to dismantle the devel-
opmental states as their mounting international debts pushed 
them closer to bankruptcy. A decade later, the communist re-
gimes began their transition to markets. In 1994, the creation of 
WTO institutionalized the interests of Core capital.  
It is tempting to take the position that this recentralization 
was inevitable. An underdeveloped Periphery could not long 
resist the expansive power of the Core countries once the latter 
had recouped their war losses and regained their growth mo-
mentum. Yet, the communist revolutions and the liberation 
movements in the Periphery came quite close to dislodging 
global capitalism. On closer examination, the argument that 
revolutions in the Periphery were incapable of overthrowing 
Core capital is not as watertight as it appears. In this case, Core 
capital had geopolitical luck on its side. 
The challenge from the Periphery was quite massive. The So-
viet Union, which mounted the systemic challenge to global 
capitalism, was a great power itself. Its industrial and military 
strength expanded rapidly in the decades following the Revolu-
tion, and, at the end of the Second World War, it had emerged as 
one of the two superpowers dominating the world. In 1950, the 
communist regimes in Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China 
stretched continuously from the Danube and the Balkans to the 
Pacific, together controlling the upper half of the Eurasian 
landmass; they also contained nearly a third of the world’s 
                                                 
4  The data in this paragraph are from Alam (2000): 151, 169.  
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population. In addition, communist parties were active in many 
Third World countries. At this point, many fully expected the 
tide of communism to roll westward into a Europe devastated 
by war, and southward into impoverished Asia and Africa. If, 
instead, Core capital successfully blocked the communist ad-
vance and the Soviet Union itself collapsed in 1990, there was 
nothing inevitable about these outcomes. 
If Core capital overcame the communist challenge, this was, 
at least in part, a fortuitous outcome of the system of nation 
states. The fact that United States was the hegemonic power dur-
ing this crucial period was a geopolitical accident; there was 
nothing in the logic of capitalist system per se that produced this 
result. Yet, this accident was of vital importance to the outcome 
of the contest between Core capital and the communist regimes 
and nationalist liberation movements in the post-war years. 
Imagine this contest with Britain still as the leading Core coun-
try. 
United States brought several vital advantages to this contest. 
The most important was size. It had vastly greater resources 
than its predecessor, Britain, had at its height. United States pro-
duced 44.7 percent of the world’s manufacturing output in 1953 
and 27 percent of the world’s output in 1950; compare this to 
Britain’s peak share of world manufacturing output of 20 per-
cent in 1860, and a share of 8.5 percent in world output in 1870.5 
American capitalism too was in some ways unique; it had a 
huge industrial working class but they possessed little class-
consciousness. As a result, organized American labor joined en-
thusiastically in the fight to undermine workers’ movements 
overseas. Capitalism—‘free enterprise,’ in the American lingo—
occupied a place in this country’s emotional life that normally 
                                                 
5  The data on shares of manufacturing output are from Bairoch (1982: 296, 
304), and the data on shares in world output are from Maddison (1994): 182-
3, 227. 
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belongs to religion, inseparable from its national existence and 
history. The communist challenge evoked very strong emotional 
defenses. Finally, the great distance of United States from the 
theatres of war in Europe ensured that it would emerge from the 
two World Wars with all its industrial assets in one piece. 
The American strategy for containing communism required 
the commitment of massive resources. The first component of 
this strategy was to put the war-devastated economies of West-
ern Europe and Japan back on their feet; some of these econo-
mies had lost more than half of their pre-war production capaci-
ties. The Marshall Plan was the centerpiece of these efforts. The 
United States injected $11.8 billion into Western Europe between 
1948 and 1952, equal to $120 billion in 1997 prices.6 In the words 
of Duignan and Gran (1997), this amounted to the “greatest vol-
untary transfer of resources from one country to another.” This 
injection of capital financed technology transfers and the import 
of vital machinery, spare parts, and raw materials, all of which 
put Western Europe’s industries back on their feet by 1952. In 
addition, the Marshall Plan pushed Western Europe towards 
economic and political cooperation, helping to lay the founda-
tions of a united Europe. United States played a similar role in 
the recovery of Japan. 
The second focus of America’s containment strategy was a 
massive military buildup. During the Cold War, the military 
spending of United States remained roughly proportional to its 
share in the global economy. In 1986, this share was 28 percent 
of the world total and 65 percent of the NATO total. It is even 
more remarkable that the Soviet Union, according to CIA esti-
mates, outspent the United States. In 1986, the military expendi-
tures of United States and Soviet Union were $365 billion and 
$374 billion respectively.7 Since the Soviet GDP was only 38 per-
                                                 
6  The data are from Duignan and Gran (1997).  
7  The data on military expenditures are from Conetta and Knight (1997). 
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cent of the US GD in 1986, this must have placed their civilian 
economy under considerable strain.8 Many experts maintain that 
this was an important factor in the eventual collapse of the So-
viet Union.  
The containment strategy had a third focus. On the one hand, 
it consisted of massive efforts to install anti-communist govern-
ments in the Periphery, prop them with military and economic 
assistance, and use them to eradicate radical movements in their 
own countries. The White House led these efforts with support 
from several agencies including the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). The Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) carried out the opposite task of overthrowing or 
destabilizing governments that were ‘unfriendly’ to United 
States. A single statistic bespeaks better than many tomes the 
power of this Agency: it spent $26.6 billions in 1997.9 
The vast economic and military resources of United States al-
lowed it to maintain a firm hegemonic grip over the global capi-
talist system. On the one hand, it created the NATO (North At-
lantic Treaty Organization) to institutionalize its military domi-
nance over the Core countries in Western Europe. In a similar 
move, Japan was converted into a military protectorate. In the 
economic arena, United States sought to stimulate economic 
growth in Western Europe and Japan by providing them rela-
tively free access to its own vast markets. In other words, the 
United States employed its dominant hegemonic position to 
eliminate military conflicts among Core countries and, in addi-
tion, replaced their economic rivalries with various cooperative 
arrangements, including the European Common Market (ECM) 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD). Freed from their old conflicts, with declining 
trade barriers, and better management of business cycles, the 
                                                 
8  Maddison (1995): 183, 187. 
9  Levin (1997). 
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Core countries went on to experience a golden period of growth 
between 1950 and 1973.   
Core capital slowly regained its intellectual confidence and 
political muscle as it grew and expanded, at home and abroad. 
On the economic front, this was visible in the assault by neoclas-
sical economists on Keynesian macroeconomic policies, the 
regulation of industries, the welfare state and social security 
programs. Politically, Core capital gained control over the levers 
of power with the election of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1979 
and President Ronald Reagan in 1980, two right-wing warriors. 
The conditions were now ripe for Core capital to stage a come-
back.  
We can agree on the factors that contributed to the collapse of 
communism but still disagree on their relative importance. First, 
and I think foremost, there was the geopolitical luck that placed 
the vast resources of the United States in the fight to contain 
communism. This not only stopped the spread of communism: it 
pushed the Soviets into a debilitating military rivalry even as 
they failed to match the growing affluence offered by the Core 
countries. In addition, the communist states were disadvantaged 
in their ideological battle against Core capital. The Core coun-
tries captured the high ground on democracy and freedoms, 
even while they sterilized the impact of these rights with money-
driven elections, media manipulation, and schooling. On the 
other hand, the communists practiced inflexible planning, re-
jected political competition, and stamped out dissent with police 
methods. They denied workers a sense of ownership in their 
workplace, and when they also failed to deliver prosperity, they 
had no chance of surviving. It was too late when the Soviets un-
dertook reforms in the late 1980s; this only deepened the feeling 
that the system was indeed rotten, and hastened its collapse. 
China avoided this catastrophic end by starting early on their 
economic reforms and delivering rapid economic growth. How-
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ever, their reforms too led to the same destination: the disman-
tling of communism. 
The end of developmental states came about differently. They 
had created hothouses for the growth of indigenous capital in 
the Periphery, a prospect that could not have pleased the Core 
countries. Since Core capital could not block the progress of de-
velopmental states, they sought to penetrate them with official 
loans, military agreements, private investments, technical assis-
tance, and access to the best graduate schools in the Core coun-
tries. In time, this would produce results. Core capital penetrated 
the key sectors of the developmental states, integrated their el-
ites into the lower rungs of the Core hierarchy, and oriented 
their most talented graduates into Core labor markets. Once 
started, this process worked by undermining the developmental 
states. 
Several forces inside the developmental states produced simi-
lar results. In their anxiety to deliver growth on the cheap—
without painful reforms—the nationalists would seek loans from 
the Core countries, regardless of the hidden costs, until their 
debt servicing placed them at the mercy of the lenders. In their 
search for easy profits, the indigenous bourgeoisie forged links 
with Core capital—as subsidiaries, suppliers, and distributors—
and, once these ties multiplied, they would lobby for the re-
moval of barriers against the penetration of Core capital. Finally, 
as some developmental states created the infrastructure and 
skills that would make them increasingly competitive in manu-
factures—threatening the Core countries with competition in 
their own markets—this would invite predatory investment 
from Core capital, eager to ensure that they owned the new in-
dustries developing in the Periphery. The strikes against devel-
opmental states were mounting. 
The dismantling of developmental states began in the early 
1980s, well before the end of the Cold War. It was triggered by 
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the cumulative impact of the two oil crises of 1974 and 1979. Un-
able to pay their higher import bills, the oil-importing develop-
mental states took out variable-interest loans from foreign banks 
secured by sovereign guarantees. When interest rates rose in 
1981, and some of these countries faced bankruptcy, the IMF and 
World Bank—the watchdogs of Core capital—stepped into the 
breach, offering new loans to stop them from defaulting on their 
old ones. At first, the borrowers were required to stabilize their 
economies, which translated into cuts in their social spending. 
This was the thin end of the wedge. In time, the conditionalities 
were expanded into “structural adjustment programs”—a code 
word for eviscerating the developmental states—which required 
eliminating trade barriers, freeing exchange markets, privatiza-
tion, and national treatment of foreign investments. 
The age of neoliberal economics had arrived. This was the 
new consensus forged in the 1980s by a cohort of orthodox 
economists, many connected to the World Bank and IMF. For 
several years, they had been developing a doctrinaire neoclassi-
cal critique of developmental states—supported by several gen-
erously funded, country-by-country assessments of the ineffi-
ciency of interventionist policies in the developmental states. 
Their vision, appropriately dubbed the “Washington Consen-
sus” by John Williamson (1994), would tilt the playing field in 
the Periphery to favor Core capital. In this new regime, the re-
formed states would guarantee national treatment to Core capi-
tal, enforce property rights—effectively, those of Core capital—
balance their budgets, and help in the provision of human capi-
tal. Core capital would step in to capture the commanding 
heights—the financial sector, utilities, communications—and 
any industry that offered handsome profits. 
The end of the Cold War produced a push to institutionalize 
the interests of Core capital in a new global framework. In 1994, 
this led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
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which bound all its members to a single set of rules—neoliberal 
rules—on trade, exchange markets, foreign investments, gov-
ernment procurements, property rights and investments. The 
WTO forced all countries to accord “national treatment” to im-
ports and foreign capital in every sector of the economy, includ-
ing services, thereby preparing the ground for rolling back the 
gains of developmental policies. All this was a signal departure 
from the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)—the 
trade regime displaced by WTO—which granted developing 
countries the right to impose protectionist trade and payments 
regimes. 
By the late 1990s, Core capital had reversed much of the de-
centralization of power that had occurred since 1917. At no pe-
riod during the past two centuries did Core capital—not even 
during its previous peak in the late nineteenth century—operate 
with so much freedom in nearly every country of the world, or 
make deeper inroads into the Periphery. In effect, the WTO 
bound the Periphery to the old open-door treaties minus extra-
territoriality; though in other respects the WTO was more inva-
sive than the open-door treaties, especially in the enforcement of 
property rights, the penetration of services, and opening up 
government contracts to foreign bids. In addition, the private 
agglomerations of Core capital in the 1990s were now incompa-
rably greater—compared to most countries in the Periphery—
than they were a hundred years back. This increased the capac-
ity of Core capital to crowd out, co-opt and absorb indigenous 
capital in the Periphery. Was this the Valhalla of Core capital, 
the dream of the prophets of laissez faire? 
 
Recentralization: Economic Consequences 
 
Contrary to the grandiose claims made by the ideologues, the 
neoliberal, open-door economic regimes imposed on the Periph-
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ery by Core capital – starting in the 1980s – have produced no 
economic miracles. Instead, these economic regimes have 
brought economic ruin or, at best, lack-luster performance to the 
countries they have touched most deeply. 
In order to identify the failure of neoliberal economics, we 
will compare the growth record of the Periphery in the two dec-
ades before and after 1980. First, consider the two decades pre-
ceding 1980 when nearly all countries in the Periphery protected 
their manufactures, regulated their currency markets, engaged 
in deficit spending, and their governments took on entrepreneu-
rial roles. By the norms of neoliberal economics, they violated all 
the rules of good economic housekeeping. Yet, they recorded 
quite impressive growth rates under these interventionist re-
gimes. The GDP of low-income countries grew at average an-
nual rates of 4.6 and 4.5 percent during the 1960s and 1970s; the 
corresponding figures for the middle-income countries were 6.0 
and 5.6 percent. There were no strong regional variations in the 
growth record for this period. Although growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa faltered during the 1970s, there were nine countries in this 
region whose average annual growth rates exceeded 5.0 percent 
during this decade.10 
Over the next two decades, as the World Bank and IMF 
forced neoliberal policies upon them, the growth rates in the Pe-
riphery declined in proportion to their embrace of these policies. 
The neoliberal policies took their first toll in Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Both regions suffered a precipitous decline 
in their GDP growth rates to 1.7 percent during the 1980s, pro-
ducing declining per capita incomes. The growth rates in Latin 
America recovered during the 1990s to 3.4 percent per annum, 
though this was significantly below their pre-1980 levels. The 
growth rate for Sub-Saharan Africa improved only marginally 
                                                 
10 World Bank (1983): 150-51.  
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during the 1990s, and it was unable to stem the decline in its per 
capita income.11 
The collapse of Eastern Europe and Central Asia came next, 
with their rapid integration into global capitalism starting in the 
1990s. Their economic decline was striking. Although the 
growth performance of these economies had been weakening for 
some time, they still managed to log an annual growth rate of 2.4 
percent in their GDP during the 1980s. However, their precipi-
tate transition to markets produced catastrophic results. During 
the 1990s, their GDP declined at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, 
more than wiping out the gains of the previous decade. It is 
doubtful if any economic region of comparable size has experi-
enced a similar decline in its output. Soon, their fertility rates fell 
significantly below replacement levels, producing a declining 
population.12 
The economic decline of the Middle East and North Africa 
since the 1980s has been nearly as steep as in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica. Their GDP growth rates in the two decades after 1980 were 
significantly below those for the two preceding decades. As a 
result, the region’s per capita income declined between 1980 and 
2000. This was not due to declining oil prices alone. The non-oil 
economies in this region shared in this decline; their GDP had 
grown at 2.9 percent annually between 1950 and 1980, but this 
declined to 1.5 percent in the two decades after 1980. This de-
cline occurred at a time when the non-oil economies, barring 
Syria, were liberalizing their trade and payments regimes.13 
Most countries in East and South Asia, which had made strik-
ing progress in the transition to neoliberal economic regimes, 
                                                 
11 World Bank (2001): 295.  
12 World Bank (2001): 295, 297. 
13 Sevket Pamuk, The Middle East and North Africa in the age of globalization, 1980-
2000 (Paper presented at the 13th IEHA Congress at Buenos Aires, August 
2002): http://www.eh.net/XIIICongress/cd/papers/7Pamuk 421. pdf 
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followed the same pattern. Their growth rates in the two dec-
ades after 1980 were visibly lower than in the two preceding 
decades. Notably, this group includes the most advanced coun-
tries in the region—Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Thailand and Malaysia—as well as the poorer countries: 
Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines and Pakistan. 
There were few countries in the Periphery that escaped the 
declining trend in growth rates in the post-1980 period. India 
and China, the two largest countries in the Periphery with more 
than one-third of the world’s population, nearly doubled their 
GDP growth rates in this period compared to their record in the 
three previous decades. Although both countries enacted market 
reforms since 1980, they were still amongst the most illiberal 
economic regimes in the world, whether one examines the extent 
of state ownership in their industries or their trade and pay-
ments regime.14 A second group of countries—Myanmar, Laos 
and Vietnam—experienced dramatic upturns in their growth 
rates during the 1990s, without the benefit of a liberal regime. 
These results should surprise no one but the historically my-
opic. In the hundred years before 1950, the colonies and open-
door countries performed poorly compared to the sovereign 
countries in the Periphery—those that were generally free to 
choose interventionist policies.15  During the post-war interlude 
lasting into the 1970s, when most of the former colonies and 
open-door countries practiced strongly interventionist policies, 
                                                 
14 Wacziarg and Welch (2002) maintain that India and China remained closed 
economies as of 2000—India more than China—when judged in terms of their 
average tariffs, non-tariff-barriers, and exchange-rate premiums. In addition, 
state-ownership remained dominant in heavy industries in India; in China, this 
included the financial sector as well.  
15 The average annual growth rates of PCI in the sovereign countries were 1.00 
percent for 1870-1900, 1.61 percent for 1900-1913, and 1.34 percent for 1913-
1950. The corresponding figures for the colonies and open-door countries were 
0.59, 0.50 and -0.27. Alam (2000): 151. 
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they experienced a dramatic acceleration in their growth rates. It 
is scarcely surprising that the forced return to open-door policies 
in the Periphery, since the 1980s, has repeated the results from 
the past. It is not clear how long India and China, the two major 
countries that have not yet surrendered their economic sover-
eignty, can resist conversion to neoliberal economic regimes. 
The re-centralization of power by Core capital that began in 
the 1980s was quite swift and mostly non-violent, unlike the cen-
tralization that reached its peak in the last decades of the nine-
teenth century. Perhaps, this is not surprising. The first centrali-
zation was a pioneering movement: it involved the creation, ex-
tension and deepening of core-controlled systems of transport, 
trade, finance, investment, cultural instruments, and subordinate 
classes in the Periphery. It took centuries to establish this system, 
often involving wars. However, when the colonial powers de-
parted from their colonies, in most cases, they did not fully liq-
uidate these long-established systems of control. While they 
terminated direct political controls, and ended their military 
presence, many of the economic and social linkages, though 
weakened, persisted in most former colonies; only the commu-
nist countries severed nearly all their linkages with Core coun-
tries. This is what made the second re-centralization easier.  
The Core countries began to reinforce their informal systems 
of control as soon as they lowered their flags over their former 
colonies. The reinforcements took many forms, including foreign 
aid, military assistance, joint military exercises, training pro-
grams, and foreign investments. When Core countries, now 
working in unison, articulated their new determination—
through IMF, World Bank and the OECD—to impose neoliberal 
regimes on the former colonies in the 1980s, there was little resis-
tance. For the most part, the elites in the Periphery had already 
been integrated into the hierarchy of power emanating from the 
Core; they also understood that resistance carried unacceptable 
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costs. There was no popular resistance because re-centralization 
did not affect the visible symbols of sovereignty. The communist 
countries too were re-integrated without firing a shot. They were 
overthrown from within, since they failed to deliver prosperity, 
freedom or a sense of ownership. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The swift and easy recentralization of the global economy cre-
ated a paradoxical situation. United States still commanded a 
massive military force while the combined military strength of 
its main adversaries was less than a third its former size.16 This 
led to calls to downsize the military, an intolerable prospect for 
the industries whose profits depend on military contracts. This 
had to be remedied. 
The refurbished power of Core capital was creating some 
domestic problems too. On the one hand, Core capital was erod-
ing the social gains made by workers, consumers, and environ-
mentalists since the 1930s. More importantly, the labor force in 
the Core countries was beginning to face competition from the 
growth of industrial production and advanced skills in some 
countries at the Periphery. They were also losing jobs as Core 
capital relocated to the Periphery, a process being accelerated by 
the internet revolution. In addition, Core capital was using its 
muscle to import cheaper skilled workers into the markets of 
Core countries. Faced with a sustained decline in their living 
standards—the first in the history of industrial capitalism—a 
growing number of people in the Core countries were gravitat-
ing towards anti-Corporatist, anti-globalization movements. 
This too had to be remedied. 
                                                 
16 In 1994, according to Conetta and Knight (1997) US military expenditure was 
$288 billion, while that of Potential Threat States was $167 billion; in 1986 
the corresponding figures were $365 billion and $550 billion.  
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These problems would be solved by inventing new enemies. 
It was in this context that Bernard Lewis (1990) first invented the 
“clash of civilizations” between the West and Islam. He argued 
that the Islamist opposition in the Middle East represented “a 
mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and 
policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less 
than a clash of civilizations – the perhaps irrational but surely 
historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian 
heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of 
both in 1990, that the West was engaged in a veritable clash of 
civilization with Islam.” Three years later, Samuel Huntington 
(1993) generalized this thesis into a historical principle. At the 
end of the Cold War, he prophesied, the world is entering a new 
age, whose conflicts will occur along the fault lines of civiliza-
tions, mostly between the West and Islam, and the West and 
China. 
The Clash thesis set up the military machine for capture by 
powerful special interests and voting blocks within United 
States. Quickly, the Israeli lobby, Christian fundamentalists, the 
oil interests, and military contractors joined forces. Each would 
pursue its specific goal—eliminating threats to Israel’s hegem-
ony, Christianizing Islamic societies, capturing oil profits, resist-
ing military cuts—by mobilizing America’s redundant military 
to re-colonize the Middle East. It was not hard selling this impe-
rialist project to Americans. The Arab regimes were easily 
painted into a corner. They were tyrannies, they possessed 
weapons of mass destruction, they were an imminent threat to 
American lives, they opposed Western values, and they threat-
ened Israel. A great nation, the greatest there has ever been, 
would have little difficulty manufacturing a clash of civilizations 
when it needed one. 
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